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FACULTY SENATE AGENDA 
November 5, 2018 
3:00 – 5:00 p.m.  
Merrill-Cazier Library, Room 154 
 
  
Agenda 
 
 
3:00      Call to Order ............................................................................................................ Becki Lawver 
 Approval of the October 1, 2018 Minutes 
 
3:05      University Business ................................................................................... Frank Galey, Provost 
 
3:20      Information 
 Faculty Forum – November 12, 2018 ....................................................................... Becki Lawver  
 EPC Monthly Report – October 4, 2018 ................................................................. Edward Reeve 
  
3:25 Reports 
             Libraries Advisory Council Annual Report .................................................................. Bryce Fifield 
 
3:35     Old Business 
 Code 405.11.4 (External Reviewers) ..................................................................... Britt Fagerheim 
 
3:45 New Business 
             Proposal to Develop USU Greenhouse Gas Emissions Resolution ...................... Patrick Belmont 
             (IPCC Report) 
 
4:00     Adjourn 
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FACULTY SENATE MINUTES 
October 1, 2018 
3:00 – 5:00 pm 
Merrill-Cazier Library, Room 154 
 
 
Call to Order - Kimberly Lott 
 Approval of September 10, 2018 Minutes 
Minutes approved as distributed. 
 
University Business - Frank Galey, Provost 
The AAEO office is conducting searches for a Title IX Coordinator and an AA/EO/Title IX Director.  
The Title IX search is likely going to be readvertised and Dale Andersen and Mica McKinney will 
help out the office and work through any issues that come up.  President Cockett sent out a note 
regarding the music program and she emphasized that USU takes these allegations very 
seriously.  There is an independent counsel working on this latest issue involving Professor Hirst.  
The professor’s teaching assignments have been redistributed.  We are working on the General 
Education program at USU as this was an issue raised by the accredication team.  USU needs to 
do a better job assessing the overall program including depth and breadth courses.  A task force 
has been pulled together and includes Lee Rickords who is chair of the General Education 
Committee.  This will be a meaningful process and we will make sure that it has minimal impact 
on the faculty members.  If faculty have any ideas on how this can be done they will need to go 
through the General Education subcommittee by contacting Lee Rickords.   
 
Classififcation regarding the Carnegie Community Engagement.  Currently we are working with a 
writing group to submit an application to Carnegie on behalf of USU.  This application process is 
only done every five years.  A Qualtrics survey was send out and everyone was asked to pay 
attention and complete the survey.  There has been an overwhelming response up to this point.     
 
Information 
 EPC Monthly Report – September 6, 2018 – Nicholas Morrison 
General Education – nothing to report 
Academic Standards – nothing to report 
13 Course approval requests were approved 
Three R401 program proposals were approved 
 
Reports 
             EPC Annual Report – Nicholas Morrison 
776 Course approval requests for the 2017-2018 academic year 
29 R401 program proposals 
Added a section of “course objectives” in Curriculog for semester course approvals 
Approval of a “Syllabus Tools” in CANVAS 
27 General Education designations were approved 
Discontinued the 15-year statute of limitations for General Education coursework at USU 
Approved registered students policy 
Approved Language for Final Examinations and No-Test Days policy 
Approved Student Code revision 
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Motion to approve the EPC Annual Report made by Matt Omasta.  Seconded by Ralph Meyer.  
Report approved. 
 
             Honors Annual Report - Kristine Miller 
Currently the Honors program has 722 honors students and they are engaged with over 500 
faculty.  This collaboration provides Honors students with unique experiences.  As we talk 
nationally about what is going on at other institutions, we find that we are on the cutting edge of 
Honors programs. Some key things that are happening is having faculty use standardized sheets 
and include these Honors experiences as part of their promotion and tenure submissions as well 
as developing an alumni mentoring program that will let them connect over the years. Retention 
and graduation rates are about one quarter of each class.   
Motion to approve the Honors Annual Report made by Bryce Fifield.  Seconded by Timothy 
Taylor.  Report approved. 
 
New Business 
             Faculty Senate Meeting Time Change – Kimberly Lott 
The Faculty Senate Executive Committee moved its start time to 3:30 pm.  This change does not 
require a faculty code change.  However, if the Faculty Senate wanted to change its start it would 
require a code change.  (See class/bell schedule)  It the meetings were go past 5:00 pm it would 
be difficult for parents who have to pick up children an dmoving the meetings to Tuesday for 
Thursdays would cause even more conflicts.  Student representatives have meetings at 4:00 pm.  
A non-binding straw poll was taken. 
Motion to have a non-binding straw poll made by Ben George.  Seconded by Jaren Hunsaker. 
Leave meeting at 3:00 pm –32 in favor 
Move earlier or later – 6 in favor  
Either option - 10 in favor 
We will pull together a more detailed proposal regarding this item.   
 
 Code 403.3.1 Standards of Conduct-Faculty Responsibilities to Student - Kimberly Lott 
President Cockett and Interim Provost Smith asked that the Facutly Senate President examine 
code 403 in regards to what has happened in the piano program.  PRPC is the official writer of 
code and they will be instrumental in bringing forth the recommended code changes.  
 
Consideration into what capacity and in what modes of speech faculty use in social media.  Some 
comments can/may be misconstrued.  Personal interpretation can come into play with the faculty 
or the students. 
 
The following questions came out of this discussion: 
• Do we define any of these terms anywhere else? 
• Is grading considered discriminatory? 
• Is this a failure in the existing process and will changing the verbage make any 
difference? 
 
Similarly PRPC needs to include clear definitions of intimdation and humiliation.  Students could 
come up with any reason for mistreatment so there needs to be a clear understanding.  PRPC is 
being asked to address details and definitions.  Voting to move code to PRPC, not voting on 
actual wording today.  The proposed changes are just suggestions.    Frame this into something 
more positive like define the terms.  Also take into account that this is not going to solve all 
problems.  Make this a little more inspiring.  Focused look on defining discrimination and 
harassment.  Move only #11 forward and not #12. In #11 add abuse. Combine #11 and #12. Do 
not abuse or exploit international students.   
  
Motion to send Code 403.3.1 to PRPC made by Matt Omasta.  Seconded by Ralph Meyer.  
Moved to PRPC 
44 – in favor 
2 – not in favor 
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 Code 403.3.2 Standards of Conduct-Professional Obligations - Kimberly Lott 
It was noted that sometimes critics of other’s work is not always friendly and disagreements do 
arise.  We need to think about broadening the language to include others than just employees 
and faculty, i.e., volunteers, etc.  Look at a different approach as this verbage may or may not 
change the problem.   
 
The questions were asked: 
• Why didn’t the processes fix this before?   
• What will make the university run better?   
• What can we do looking forward? 
 
Take a more focused look at what we do and don’t want to happen with our faculty.  Follow-up 
with punitive actions that can/will be taken with individuals.  Do #10 but not #11.  This is a 
proactive action.   
Motion to send Code 403.3.2 to PRPC made by Patrick Belmont.  Seconded by Dan Holland.  
Moved to PRPC. 
38 – in favor 
5 – not in favor 
 
 Code 407.1.1 Non-punitive Measures - Kimberly Lott 
Different levels of reprimand.   
Motion to send to PRPC made by Victor Lee. Seecond by Steve Daniels. Moved to PRPC. 
 
Code 407.11.2 Inquiry into Allegations of Violation Policies 407.8 and/or 407.9 - Kimberly Lott 
Big difference in tone into what is stricken vs. the new version.  This will be a default response.  In the 
stricken there is a fair amount of detail regarding due process check.  The Provost is usally the one 
representing the academic end of the university.  The word harm needs to be defined.  Taking the 
stricken part out removes the only time the word “harm” is used.  Harm to students and faculty as well. 
Motion to move to PRPC made by Bryce Fifield.  Seconded by Corey Christiansen.  Moved to PRPC. 
40 – in favor 
1 – not in fabor 
1 - abstain 
 
 Code 407.11.3 Protection of Complainant and Others - Kimberly Lott 
Motion to move to PRPC made by Bryce Fifield.  Seconded by Corey Christiansen.  Moved to 
PRPC. 
 
Old Business 
 Nominating Committee Code - Kimberly Lott 
Creating a new committee to help with election of the Faculty Senate president-elect.  Talked at 
FSEC and after lengthly converstation we decided to table indefinitely.  Not doing anything with 
this right now.  Trying to make some informal changes to help with this. 
 
Adjourn 4:20 pm 
 
Monday, November 12, 2018
3:00 p.m. — 4:30 p.m. 
Merrill-Cazier Library Room 154 
 2018-2019 Session 
Invitation to Faculty Forum 
FACULTY SENATE 
LEADERSHIP 
Senate President 
Rebecca Lawver
435-797-1254
rebecca.lawver@usu.edu
Past-President 
Kimberly Lott
435-797-1103
kimberly.lott@usu.edu
President-Elect 
Patrick Belmont
435-797-3794
patrick.belmont@usu.edu
Executive Secretary 
Michele Hillard 
435-797-0121
michele.hillard@usu.edu 
Faculty Forum is held once a year 
in November. Participants may 
discuss subjects of current 
interest, question and debate any 
policies and procedures, and 
formulate recommendations for 
consideration by the Faculty 
Senate. The Faculty Forum 
Executive Committee will set the 
agenda for the meeting. 
Attendance is for faculty only; 
administrators are not invited. 
Report from the Educational Policies Committee 
October 4, 2018 
 
 
The Educational Policies Committee (EPC) met on October 4, 2018.  The agenda and 
minutes of the meeting are posted on the Educational Policies Committee web page 
(www.usu.edu/epc).  
During the October 4, 2018, meeting of the EPC, the following actions were taken:  
 
1.   General Education Subcommittee  
• No Action Items.  Discussion presented on the Northwest Commission on 
Colleges and Universities (NWCCU) Accreditation Review and General 
Education 
 
2..   Academic Standards Subcommittee 
• No Report.  
 
3.   Curriculum Subcommittee  
• Approval of 123-course requests. 
 
• Approval of a request from the Department of History in the College of 
Humanities and Social Sciences to offer a Masters in Ancient 
Languages and Cultures. 
 
• Approvals of the request from the Department of English in the College of 
Humanities and Social Sciences to change the name from American 
Studies to Folklore and American Studies. Restructure Folklore and 
American Studies.  
 
• Approval of the request the Department of Languages, Philosophy and 
Communication Studies in the College of Humanities and Social Sciences 
to offer a Baccalaureate degree in Chinese. 
 
• Table the request from the Department of Sociology, Social Work and 
Anthropology in the College of Humanities and Social Sciences to 
establish an I-System Institute for Transdisciplinary Studies. 
University Libraries Advisory Council 
 
Report to the Utah State University Faculty Senate 
October 2018 
 
Charge 
The University Libraries Advisory Council advises the Vice-Provost for University Libraries and 
Instructional Support in (1) meeting the learning, instruction, and research needs of students, 
faculty and staff; (2) formulating library policies in relation to circulation, services, and the 
collection development of resources for instruction and research; and (3) interpreting the needs 
and policies of the libraries to the University. The Council membership consists of nine faculty 
members, one from each College and Extension with one undergraduate and graduate student 
appointed by the Provost. Faculty members serve three-year terms and are renewable once. The 
Vice-Provost for University Libraries and Instructional Support serves as an ex-officio, non-voting 
member. The chair is elected from the Council membership on an annual basis.  
(https://www.usu.edu/policies/105/, accessed September 20, 2018). 
 
Council Members (2017-2018) 
Council members who served during the 2017-2018 academic year included:  David Wall, Caine 
College of the Arts, Chair; Charles Miller, College of Engineering; Susanne Janecke, College of 
Science; Bryce Fifield, Emma Eccles Jones College of Education and Human Services; Travis 
Dowdle, USUSU Science Senator; Anuj Khasgiwala, Graduate Student Senator; Steven Hanks, 
Huntsman School of Business; Amanda, College of Agriculture and Extension; Christine Cooper-
Rompato, College of Humanities and Social Sciences; Peter Adler, College of Natural Resources; 
Dean Brad Cole, Ex-officio, Libraries and Instructional Support. 
 
2017-2018 Activities 
The Library Advisory Council met twice during the 2017-2018 academic year.  Key topics 
addressed included the following: 
The expansion of student digital exhibits to involve more faculty and students.  The purpose of 
the digital exhibits initiative is to encourage faculty to think differently about research 
assignments and outputs and to encourage students to interact directly with primary resources.  
Student digital exhibits are available at http://exhibits.usu.edu/exhibits.   
The challenges of meeting the increasing costs of journal costs with existing fee and funding 
structures.  Last year, there was an inflationary increase of $275,000 and is expected to exceed 
$300,000 next year.  Council members provided input on several cost-reducing strategies.   
Council members also solicited input from their colleges and academic departments on the 
impact of cancelling selected journal packages. 
Council members participated in and provided input into the Library’s strategic planning process.  
The involvement of Library employees, faculty, researchers, students, and other stakeholders is 
identifying a number of possible strategic areas and initiatives.  Library staff participated in 
departmental retreats this fall and conducted a faculty survey.  From these sources, Library staff, 
with input from the Council are selecting five or six critical issues to address over the coming 
year. 
Council members provided input into a number of Library services, programs, and resources 
including The Human Library, availability of a remote book drop, support for student research, 
inservice resources for new and existing faculty, and development/fundraising efforts.  An 
ongoing issue is the difficulty of informing students, faculty, and other campus constituents 
about the availability of Library services and resources.  Council members have provided 
suggestions about possible communication strategies and in turn are encouraged to 
communicate with their own academic units about these issues.   
Original Code: 
 
405.7.211.47.2 Additional Events During the Year in which a Tenure Decision is to be Made 
(1) External peer reviews. 
Prior to September 15, the department head or supervisor will make a solicitation of letters from at 
least four peers of rank equivalent to or higher than that sought by the candidate. If fewer than four 
letters arrive, additional letters will be solicited only to attain the minimum of four letters. 
The reviewers must be external to the university and must be held with respect in academe. The 
candidate will be asked to submit the names of potential reviewers and to state the nature of his or her 
acquaintance with each of them. The number of names should be at least equal to the number of letters 
to be solicited. At least one-half of the reviewers must be selected from the candidate's list. The 
candidate may also submit names of potential reviewers that he or she does not want contacted, 
although this list is not binding on the department head or supervisor. 
The department head or supervisor and the tenure advisory committee shall mutually agree to the peer 
reviewers from whom letters will be solicited. A summary of the pertinent information in his or her file 
initially prepared by the candidate and a cover letter initially drafted by the department head or 
supervisor with final drafts mutually agreed upon by the candidate, the tenure advisory committee, and 
the department head or supervisor shall be sent to each reviewer by the department head or 
supervisor. Each external reviewer should be asked to state, the nature of his or her acquaintance with 
the candidate and to evaluate the performance, record, accomplishments, recognition and standing of 
the candidate in the major area of emphasis of his or her role statement. If the candidate, department 
head, and tenure advisory committee all agree, external reviewers may be asked to evaluate the 
secondary area of emphasis in the role statement as well. Copies of these letters will become 
supplementary material to the candidate's file (see Code 405.6.3). 
Under exceptional circumstances, a waiver of the external review process may be granted by the 
president when such a process is operationally not feasible for a particular set of academic titles and 
ranks. 
 
Proposed Code Change: 
 
405.117.427.2 Additional Events During the Year in which a Tenure Decision is to be Made 
(1) External peer reviews. 
Prior to September 15, the department head or supervisor will make a solicitation of letters from at 
least four peers of rank equivalent to or higher than that sought by the candidate. If fewer than four 
letters arrive, additional letters will be solicited only to attain the minimum of four letters. 
 
The candidate will be asked to submit the names of potential reviewers and to state the nature of his or 
her acquaintance with each of them. The reviewers must be external to the university and must be held 
in high regard by the academic community. The reviewers must be external to the university and must 
be held with respect in academe in high regard by the academic community. These persons should be 
familiar with the candidate’s field of study and may know the candidate., but those with potential 
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conflicts of interest should not be asked to serve as a reviewer. but the reviewer must be far 
enough removed from the candidate as to avoid a conflict of interest.  A candidate may be asked to 
submit additional names if it is decided that the nature of the candidate’s acquaintance with the 
potential reviewers might prevent them from making an objective evaluation.  The number of names 
should be at least equal to the number of letters to be solicited. At least one-half of the reviewers must 
be selected from the candidate's list. The candidate may also submit names of potential reviewers that 
he or she does not want contacted, although this list is not binding on the department head or 
supervisor. 
The department head or supervisor and the tenure advisory committee shall mutually agree to the peer 
reviewers from whom letters will be solicited to ensure an objective appraisal of the candidate’s file..  A 
summary of the pertinent information in his or her file initially prepared by the candidate and a cover 
letter initially drafted by the department head or supervisor with final drafts mutually agreed upon by 
the candidate, the tenure advisory committee, and the department head or supervisor shall be sent to 
each reviewer by the department head or supervisor. Each external reviewer should be asked to 
state (i) the nature of his or her acquaintance with the candidate; and (ii) if any potential 
conflicts of interest exist. External reviewers will be asked to evaluate the performance, record, 
accomplishments, recognition and standing of the candidate in the major area of emphasis of 
his or her role statement. Each external reviewer should be asked to state, the nature of his or her 
acquaintance with the candidate and to evaluate the performance, record, accomplishments, 
recognition and standing of the candidate in the major area of emphasis of his or her role statement. If 
the candidate, department head, and tenure advisory committee all agree, external reviewers may be 
asked to evaluate the secondary area of emphasis in the role statement as well. Copies of these letters 
will become supplementary material to the candidate's file (see Code 405.6.3). 
 
Under exceptional circumstances, a waiver of the external review process may be granted by the 
president when such a process is operationally not feasible for a particular set of academic titles and 
ranks. 
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GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 °C 
 
an IPCC special report on the impacts of global 
warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and 
related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, 
in the context of strengthening the global response 
to the threat of climate change, sustainable 
development, and efforts to eradicate poverty 
 
 
 
Summary for Policymakers 
 
 
 
This Summary for Policymakers was formally approved at the  
First Joint Session of Working Groups I, II and III of the IPCC  
and accepted by the 48th Session of the IPCC, Incheon,  
Republic of Korea, 6 October 2018.  
 
SUBJECT TO COPY EDIT 
 
Approved SPM – copyedit pending  IPCC SR1.5 
 
 
 
 SPM-1 Total pages: 33 
 
 
 
Summary for Policymakers 
 
 
 
Drafting Authors: Myles Allen (UK), Mustafa Babiker (Sudan), Yang Chen (China), Heleen de 
Coninck (Netherlands), Sarah Connors (UK), Renée van Diemen (Netherlands), Opha Pauline Dube 
(Botswana), Kris Ebi (USA), Francois Engelbrecht (South Africa), Marion Ferrat (UK/France), 
James Ford (UK), Piers Forster (UK), Sabine Fuss (Germany), Tania Guillen (Germany/Nicaragua), 
Jordan Harold (UK), Ove Hoegh-Guldberg (Australia), Jean-Charles Hourcade (France), Daniel 
Huppmann (Austria),  Daniela Jacob (Germany), Kejun Jiang (China), Tom Gabriel Johansen 
(Norway), Mikiko Kainuma (Japan), Kiane de Kleijne (Netherlands), Elmar Kriegler (Germany), 
Debora Ley (Guatemala/Mexico), Diana Liverman (USA), Natalie Mahowald (USA), Valérie 
Masson-Delmotte (France), Robin Matthews (UK), Reinhard Melcher (Austria), Richard Millar 
(UK), Katja Mintenbeck (Germany), Angela Morelli (Norway/Italy), Wilfran Moufouma-Okia 
(France/Congo), Luis Mundaca (Sweden/Chile), Maike Nicolai (Germany), Chukwumerije Okereke 
(UK/Nigeria), Minal Pathak (India), Anthony Payne (UK), Roz Pidcock (UK), Anna Pirani (Italy), 
Elvira Poloczanska (UK/Australia), Hans-Otto Pörtner (Germany), Aromar Revi (India), Keywan 
Riahi (Austria), Debra C. Roberts (South Africa), Joeri Rogelj (Austria/Belgium), Joyashree Roy 
(India), Sonia Seneviratne (Switzerland), Priyadarshi R.Shukla (India), James Skea (UK), Raphael 
Slade (UK), Drew Shindell (USA), Chandni Singh (India), William Solecki (USA), Linda Steg 
(Netherlands), Michael Taylor (Jamaica), Petra Tschakert (Australia/Austria), Henri Waisman 
(France), Rachel Warren (UK), Panmao Zhai (China), Kirsten Zickfeld (Canada) 
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Introduction 
 
This report responds to the invitation for IPCC ‘... to provide a Special Report in 2018 on the 
impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas 
emission pathways’ contained in the Decision of the 21st Conference of Parties of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to adopt the Paris Agreement.1 
 
The IPCC accepted the invitation in April 2016, deciding to prepare this Special Report on the 
impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas 
emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate 
change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty. 
 
This Summary for Policy Makers (SPM) presents the key findings of the Special Report, based on 
the assessment of the available scientific, technical and socio-economic literature2 relevant to global 
warming of 1.5°C and for the comparison between global warming of 1.5°C and 2°C above pre-
industrial levels. The level of confidence associated with each key finding is reported using the 
IPCC calibrated language.3 The underlying scientific basis of each key finding is indicated by 
references provided to chapter elements. In the SPM, knowledge gaps are identified associated with 
the underlying chapters of the report.  
  
                                               
 
 
1 Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 21. 
 
2 The assessment covers literature accepted for publication by 15 May 2018. 
 
3 Each finding is grounded in an evaluation of underlying evidence and agreement. A level of confidence is expressed using five 
qualifiers: very low, low, medium, high and very high, and typeset in italics, for example, medium confidence. The following terms 
have been used to indicate the assessed likelihood of an outcome or a result: virtually certain 99–100% probability, very likely 90–
100%, likely 66–100%, about as likely as not 33–66%, unlikely 0–33%, very unlikely 0–10%, exceptionally unlikely 0–1%. 
Additional terms (extremely likely 95–100%, more likely than not >50–100%, more unlikely than likely 0–<50%, extremely unlikely 
0–5%) may also be used when appropriate. Assessed likelihood is typeset in italics, for example, very likely. This is consistent with 
AR5.  
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A. Understanding Global Warming of 1.5°C4 
 
A1. Human activities are estimated to have caused approximately 1.0°C of global warming5 
above pre-industrial levels, with a likely range of 0.8°C to 1.2°C. Global warming is likely to 
reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 2052 if it continues to increase at the current rate. (high 
confidence) {1.2, Figure SPM.1} 
 
A1.1. Reflecting the long-term warming trend since pre-industrial times, observed global mean 
surface temperature (GMST) for the decade 2006–2015 was 0.87°C (likely between 0.75°C and 
0.99°C)6 higher than the average over the 1850–1900 period (very high confidence). Estimated 
anthropogenic global warming matches the level of observed warming to within ±20% (likely 
range). Estimated anthropogenic global warming is currently increasing at 0.2°C (likely between 
0.1°C and 0.3°C) per decade due to past and ongoing emissions (high confidence). {1.2.1, Table 
1.1, 1.2.4} 
 
A1.2. Warming greater than the global annual average is being experienced in many land regions 
and seasons, including two to three times higher in the Arctic. Warming is generally higher over 
land than over the ocean. (high confidence) {1.2.1, 1.2.2, Figure 1.1, Figure 1.3, 3.3.1, 3.3.2} 
 
A1.3.  Trends in intensity and frequency of some climate and weather extremes have been detected 
over time spans during which about 0.5°C of global warming occurred (medium confidence). This 
assessment is based on several lines of evidence, including attribution studies for changes in 
extremes since 1950. {3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3}  
 
A.2. Warming from anthropogenic emissions from the pre-industrial period to the present 
will persist for centuries to millennia and will continue to cause further long-term changes in 
the climate system, such as sea level rise, with associated impacts (high confidence), but these 
emissions alone are unlikely to cause global warming of 1.5°C (medium confidence) {1.2, 3.3, 
Figure 1.5, Figure SPM.1} 
 
A2.1. Anthropogenic emissions (including greenhouse gases, aerosols and their precursors) up to 
the present are unlikely to cause further warming of more than 0.5°C over the next two to three 
decades (high confidence) or on a century time scale (medium confidence). {1.2.4, Figure 1.5} 
 
  
                                               
 
 
4 SPM BOX.1: Core Concepts 
 
5 Present level of global warming is defined as the average of a 30-year period centered on 2017 assuming the recent rate of warming 
continues. 
 
6 This range spans the four available peer-reviewed estimates of the observed GMST change and also accounts for additional 
uncertainty due to possible short-term natural variability. {1.2.1, Table 1.1} 
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A2.2. Reaching and sustaining net-zero global anthropogenic CO2 emissions and declining net non-
CO2 radiative forcing would halt anthropogenic global warming on multi-decadal timescales (high 
confidence). The maximum temperature reached is then determined by cumulative net global 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions up to the time of net zero CO2 emissions (high confidence) and the 
level of non-CO2 radiative forcing in the decades prior to the time that maximum temperatures are 
reached (medium confidence). On longer timescales, sustained net negative global anthropogenic 
CO2 emissions and/or further reductions in non-CO2 radiative forcing may still be required to 
prevent further warming due to Earth system feedbacks and reverse ocean acidification (medium 
confidence) and will be required to minimise sea level rise (high confidence). {Cross-Chapter Box 2 
in Chapter 1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, Figure 1.4, 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 3.4.4.8, 3.4.5.1, 3.6.3.2} 
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Figure SPM.1: Panel a: Observed monthly global mean surface temperature (GMST) change grey 
line up to 2017, from the HadCRUT4, GISTEMP, Cowtan–Way, and NOAA datasets) and 
estimated anthropogenic global warming (solid orange line up to 2017, with orange shading 
indicating assessed likely range). Orange dashed arrow and horizontal orange error bar show 
respectively central estimate and likely range of the time at which 1.5°C is reached if the current 
rate of warming continues. The grey plume on the right of Panel a) shows the likely range of 
warming responses, computed with a simple climate model, to a stylized pathway (hypothetical 
future) in which net CO2 emissions (grey line in panels b and c) decline in a straight line from 2020 
to reach net zero in 2055 and net non-CO2 radiative forcing (grey line in panel d) increases to 2030 
and then declines. The blue plume in panel a) shows the response to faster CO2 emissions 
reductions (blue line in panel b), reaching net zero in 2040, reducing cumulative CO2 emissions 
(panel c). The purple plume shows the response to net CO2 emissions declining to zero in 2055, 
with net non-CO2 forcing remaining constant after 2030. The vertical error bars on right of panel a) 
show the likely ranges (thin lines) and central terciles (33rd – 66th percentiles, thick lines) of the 
estimated distribution of warming in 2100 under these three stylized pathways. Vertical dotted error 
bars in panels b, c and d show the likely range of historical annual and cumulative global net CO2 
emissions in 2017 (data from the Global Carbon Project) and of net non-CO2 radiative forcing in 
2011 from AR5, respectively. Vertical axes in panels c and d are scaled to represent approximately 
equal effects on GMST. {1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 2.3, Chapter 1 Figure 1.2 & Chapter 1 Supplementary 
Material, Cross-Chapter Box 2} 
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A3. Climate-related risks for natural and human systems are higher for global warming of 
1.5°C than at present, but lower than at 2°C (high confidence). These risks depend on the 
magnitude and rate of warming, geographic location, levels of development and vulnerability, 
and on the choices and implementation of adaptation and mitigation options (high confidence) 
(Figure SPM.2). {1.3, 3.3, 3.4, 5.6} 
 
A3.1. Impacts on natural and human systems from global warming have already been observed 
(high confidence). Many land and ocean ecosystems and some of the services they provide have 
already changed due to global warming (high confidence). {1.4, 3.4, 3.5, Figure SPM.2} 
 
A3.2. Future climate-related risks depend on the rate, peak and duration of warming. In the 
aggregate they are larger if global warming exceeds 1.5°C before returning to that level by 2100 
than if global warming gradually stabilizes at 1.5°C, especially if the peak temperature is high (e.g., 
about 2°C) (high confidence). Some impacts may be long-lasting or irreversible, such as the loss of 
some ecosystems (high confidence). {3.2, 3.4.4, 3.6.3, Cross-Chapter Box 8} 
 
A3.3. Adaptation and mitigation are already occurring (high confidence). Future climate-related 
risks would be reduced by the upscaling and acceleration of far-reaching, multi-level and cross-
sectoral climate mitigation and by both incremental and transformational adaptation (high 
confidence). {1.2, 1.3, Table 3.5, 4.2.2, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, Box 4.2, Box 4.3, Box 
4.6, 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.3.4, 4.3.5, 4.4.1, 4.4.4, 4.4.5, 4.5.3}   
 
B. Projected Climate Change, Potential Impacts and Associated Risks 
 
B1. Climate models project robust7 differences in regional climate characteristics between 
present-day and global warming of 1.5°C,8 and between 1.5°C and 2°C.8 These differences 
include increases in: mean temperature in most land and ocean regions (high confidence), hot 
extremes in most inhabited regions (high confidence), heavy precipitation in several regions 
(medium confidence), and the probability of drought and precipitation deficits in some regions 
(medium confidence). {3.3} 
 
B1.1. Evidence from attributed changes in some climate and weather extremes for a global warming 
of about 0.5°C supports the assessment that an additional 0.5°C of warming compared to present is 
associated with further detectable changes in these extremes (medium confidence). Several regional 
changes in climate are assessed to occur with global warming up to 1.5°C compared to pre-
industrial levels, including warming of extreme temperatures in many regions (high confidence), 
increases in frequency, intensity, and/or amount of heavy precipitation in several regions (high 
confidence), and an increase in intensity or frequency of droughts in some regions (medium 
confidence). {3.2, 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, Table 3.2} 
 
B1.2. Temperature extremes on land are projected to warm more than GMST (high confidence): 
extreme hot days in mid-latitudes warm by up to about 3°C at global warming of 1.5°C and about 
                                               
 
 
7 Robust is here used to mean that at least two thirds of climate models show the same sign of changes at the grid point scale, and that 
differences in large regions are statistically significant. 
 
8 Projected changes in impacts between different levels of global warming are determined with respect to changes in global mean 
surface air temperature. 
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4°C at 2°C, and extreme cold nights in high latitudes warm by up to about 4.5°C at 1.5°C and about 
6°C at 2°C (high confidence). The number of hot days is projected to increase in most land regions, 
with highest increases in the tropics (high confidence). {3.3.1, 3.3.2, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in 
Chapter 3} 
 
B1.3. Risks from droughts and precipitation deficits are projected to be higher at 2°C compared to 
1.5°C global warming in some regions (medium confidence). Risks from heavy precipitation events 
are projected to be higher at 2°C compared to 1.5°C global warming in several northern hemisphere 
high-latitude and/or high-elevation regions, eastern Asia and eastern North America (medium 
confidence). Heavy precipitation associated with tropical cyclones is projected to be higher at 2°C 
compared to 1.5°C global warming (medium confidence). There is generally low confidence in 
projected changes in heavy precipitation at 2°C compared to 1.5°C in other regions. Heavy 
precipitation when aggregated at global scale is projected to be higher at 2.0°C than at 1.5°C of 
global warming (medium confidence). As a consequence of heavy precipitation, the fraction of the 
global land area affected by flood hazards is projected to be larger at 2°C compared to 1.5°C of 
global warming (medium confidence). {3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.5, 3.3.6} 
 
B2. By 2100, global mean sea level rise is projected to be around 0.1 metre lower with global 
warming of 1.5°C compared to 2°C (medium confidence). Sea level will continue to rise well 
beyond 2100 (high confidence), and the magnitude and rate of this rise depends on future 
emission pathways. A slower rate of sea level rise enables greater opportunities for adaptation 
in the human and ecological systems of small islands, low-lying coastal areas and deltas 
(medium confidence). {3.3, 3.4, 3.6 } 
 
B2.1. Model-based projections of global mean sea level rise (relative to 1986-2005) suggest an 
indicative range of 0.26 to 0.77 m by 2100 for 1.5°C global warming, 0.1 m (0.04-0.16 m) less than 
for a global warming of 2°C (medium confidence).  A reduction of 0.1 m in global sea level rise 
implies that up to 10 million fewer people would be exposed to related risks, based on population in 
the year 2010 and assuming no adaptation (medium confidence). {3.4.4, 3.4.5, 4.3.2} 
 
B2.2. Sea level rise will continue beyond 2100 even if global warming is limited to 1.5°C in the 
21st century (high confidence). Marine ice sheet instability in Antarctica and/or irreversible loss of 
the Greenland ice sheet could result in multi-metre rise in sea level over hundreds to thousands of 
years. These instabilities could be triggered around 1.5°C to 2°C of global warming (medium 
confidence). {3.3.9, 3.4.5, 3.5.2, 3.6.3, Box 3.3, Figure SPM.2} 
 
B2.3. Increasing warming amplifies the exposure of small islands, low-lying coastal areas and 
deltas to the risks associated with sea level rise for many human and ecological systems, including 
increased saltwater intrusion, flooding and damage to infrastructure (high confidence). Risks 
associated with sea level rise are higher at 2°C compared to 1.5°C. The slower rate of sea level rise 
at global warming of 1.5°C reduces these risks enabling greater opportunities for adaptation 
including managing and restoring natural coastal ecosystems, and infrastructure reinforcement 
(medium confidence). {3.4.5, Figure SPM.2, Box 3.5} 
 
B3. On land, impacts on biodiversity and ecosystems, including species loss and extinction, are 
projected to be lower at 1.5°C of global warming compared to 2°C. Limiting global warming 
to 1.5°C compared to 2°C is projected to lower the impacts on terrestrial, freshwater, and 
coastal ecosystems and to retain more of their services to humans (high confidence). (Figure 
SPM.2) {3.4, 3.5, Box 3.4, Box 4.2, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3}  
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B3.1. Of 105,000 species studied,9 6% of insects, 8% of plants and 4% of vertebrates are projected 
to lose over half of their climatically determined geographic range for global warming of 1.5°C, 
compared with 18% of insects, 16% of plants and 8% of vertebrates for global warming of 2°C 
(medium confidence). Impacts associated with other biodiversity-related risks such as forest fires, 
and the spread of invasive species, are lower at 1.5°C compared to 2°C of global warming (high 
confidence). {3.4.3, 3.5.2} 
 
B3.2. Approximately 4% (interquartile range 2–7%) of the global terrestrial land area is projected to 
undergo a transformation of ecosystems from one type to another at 1ºC of global warming, 
compared with 13% (interquartile range 8–20%) at 2°C (medium confidence). This indicates that 
the area at risk is projected to be approximately 50% lower at 1.5°C compared to 2°C (medium 
confidence). {3.4.3.1, 3.4.3.5} 
  
B3.3. High-latitude tundra and boreal forests are particularly at risk of climate change-induced 
degradation and loss, with woody shrubs already encroaching into the tundra (high confidence) and 
will proceed with further warming. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C rather than 2°C is projected 
to prevent the thawing over centuries of a permafrost area in the range of 1.5 to 2.5 million km2 
(medium confidence). {3.3.2, 3.4.3, 3.5.5}  
 
B4. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C compared to 2ºC is projected to reduce increases in 
ocean temperature as well as associated increases in ocean acidity and decreases in ocean 
oxygen levels (high confidence). Consequently, limiting global warming to 1.5°C is projected 
to reduce risks to marine biodiversity, fisheries, and ecosystems, and their functions and 
services to humans, as illustrated by recent changes to Arctic sea ice and warm water coral 
reef ecosystems (high confidence). {3.3, 3.4, 3.5, Boxes 3.4, 3.5} 
 
B4.1. There is high confidence that the probability of a sea-ice-free Arctic Ocean during summer is 
substantially lower at global warming of 1.5°C when compared to 2°C. With 1.5°C of global 
warming, one sea ice-free Arctic summer is projected per century. This likelihood is increased to at 
least one per decade with 2°C global warming. Effects of a temperature overshoot are reversible for 
Arctic sea ice cover on decadal time scales (high confidence). {3.3.8, 3.4.4.7} 
 
B4.2. Global warming of 1.5°C is projected to shift the ranges of many marine species, to higher 
latitudes as well as increase the amount of damage to many ecosystems. It is also expected to drive 
the loss of coastal resources, and reduce the productivity of fisheries and aquaculture (especially at 
low latitudes). The risks of climate-induced impacts are projected to be higher at 2°C than those at 
global warming of 1.5°C (high confidence). Coral reefs, for example, are projected to decline by a 
further 70–90% at 1.5°C (high confidence) with larger losses (>99%) at 2ºC (very high confidence). 
The risk of irreversible loss of many marine and coastal ecosystems increases with global warming, 
especially at 2°C or more (high confidence). {3.4.4, Box 3.4} 
 
B4.3. The level of ocean acidification due to increasing CO2 concentrations associated with global 
warming of 1.5°C is projected to amplify the adverse effects of warming, and even further at 2°C, 
                                               
 
 
9 Consistent with earlier studies, illustrative numbers were adopted from one recent meta-study. 
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impacting the growth, development, calcification, survival, and thus abundance of a broad range of 
species, e.g., from algae to fish (high confidence). {3.3.10, 3.4.4} 
 
B4.4. Impacts of climate change in the ocean are increasing risks to fisheries and aquaculture via 
impacts on the physiology, survivorship, habitat, reproduction, disease incidence, and risk of 
invasive species (medium confidence) but are projected to be less at 1.5ºC of global warming than at 
2ºC. One global fishery model, for example, projected a decrease in global annual catch for marine 
fisheries of about 1.5 million tonnes for 1.5°C of global warming compared to a loss of more than 3 
million tonnes for 2°C of global warming (medium confidence). {3.4.4, Box 3.4} 
 
B5. Climate-related risks to health, livelihoods, food security, water supply, human security, 
and economic growth are projected to increase with global warming of 1.5°C and increase 
further with 2°C. (Figure SPM.2) {3.4, 3.5, 5.2, Box 3.2, Box 3.3, Box 3.5, Box 3.6, Cross-
Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in 
Chapter 5, 5.2}  
 
B5.1. Populations at disproportionately higher risk of adverse consequences of global warming of 
1.5°C and beyond include disadvantaged and vulnerable populations, some indigenous peoples, and 
local communities dependent on agricultural or coastal livelihoods (high confidence). Regions at 
disproportionately higher risk include Arctic ecosystems, dryland regions, small-island developing 
states, and least developed countries (high confidence). Poverty and disadvantages are expected to 
increase in some populations as global warming increases; limiting global warming to 1.5°C, 
compared with 2°C, could reduce the number of people both exposed to climate-related risks and 
susceptible to poverty by up to several hundred million by 2050 (medium confidence). {3.4.10, 
3.4.11, Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, Cross-
Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5, 4.2.2.2, 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.3, 5.6.3} 
 
B5.2. Any increase in global warming is projected to affect human health, with primarily negative 
consequences (high confidence). Lower risks are projected at 1.5°C than at 2°C for heat-related 
morbidity and mortality (very high confidence) and for ozone-related mortality if emissions needed 
for ozone formation remain high (high confidence). Urban heat islands often amplify the impacts of 
heatwaves in cities (high confidence). Risks from some vector-borne diseases, such as malaria and 
dengue fever, are projected to increase with warming from 1.5°C to 2°C, including potential shifts 
in their geographic range (high confidence). {3.4.7, 3.4.8, 3.5.5.8} 
 
B5.3. Limiting warming to 1.5°C, compared with 2ºC, is projected to result in smaller net 
reductions in yields of maize, rice, wheat, and potentially other cereal crops, particularly in sub-
Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central and South America; and in the CO2 dependent, 
nutritional quality of rice and wheat (high confidence). Reductions in projected food availability are 
larger at 2ºC than at 1.5°C of global warming in the Sahel, southern Africa, the Mediterranean, 
central Europe, and the Amazon (medium confidence). Livestock are projected to be adversely 
affected with rising temperatures, depending on the extent of changes in feed quality, spread of 
diseases, and water resource availability (high confidence). {3.4.6, 3.5.4, 3.5.5, Box 3.1, Cross-
Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4} 
 
B5.4. Depending on future socioeconomic conditions, limiting global warming to 1.5°C, compared 
to 2°C, may reduce the proportion of the world population exposed to a climate-change induced 
increase in water stress by up to 50%, although there is considerable variability between regions 
(medium confidence). Many small island developing states would experience lower water stress as a 
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result of projected changes in aridity when global warming is limited to 1.5°C, as compared to 2°C 
(medium confidence). {3.3.5, 3.4.2, 3.4.8, 3.5.5, Box 3.2, Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 
4} 
 
B5.5. Risks to global aggregated economic growth due to climate change impacts are projected to 
be lower at 1.5°C than at 2°C by the end of this century10 (medium confidence). This excludes the 
costs of mitigation, adaptation investments and the benefits of adaptation. Countries in the tropics 
and Southern Hemisphere subtropics are projected to experience the largest impacts on economic 
growth due to climate change should global warming increase from 1.5°C to 2 °C (medium 
confidence). {3.5.2, 3.5.3}  
 
B5.6. Exposure to multiple and compound climate-related risks increases between 1.5°C and 2°C of 
global warming, with greater proportions of people both so exposed and susceptible to poverty in 
Africa and Asia (high confidence). For global warming from 1.5°C to 2°C, risks across energy, 
food, and water sectors could overlap spatially and temporally, creating new and exacerbating 
current hazards, exposures, and vulnerabilities that could affect increasing numbers of people and 
regions (medium confidence). {Box 3.5, 3.3.1, 3.4.5.3, 3.4.5.6, 3.4.11, 3.5.4.9} 
 
B5.7. There are multiple lines of evidence that since the AR5 the assessed levels of risk increased 
for four of the five Reasons for Concern (RFCs) for global warming to 2°C (high confidence). The 
risk transitions by degrees of global warming are now: from high to very high between 1.5°C and 
2°C for RFC1 (Unique and threatened systems) (high confidence); from moderate to high risk 
between 1.0°C and 1.5°C for RFC2 (Extreme weather events) (medium confidence); from 
moderate to high risk between 1.5°C and 2°C for RFC3 (Distribution of impacts) (high confidence); 
from moderate to high risk between 1.5°C and 2.5°C for RFC4 (Global aggregate impacts) (medium 
confidence); and from moderate to high risk between 1°C and 2.5°C for RFC5 (Large-scale singular 
events) (medium confidence). (Figure SPM.2) {3.4.13; 3.5, 3.5.2} 
  
                                               
 
 
10 Here, impacts on economic growth refer to changes in GDP. Many impacts, such as loss of human lives, cultural heritage, and 
ecosystem services, are difficult to value and monetize. 
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White indicates that no 
impacts are detectable and 
attributable to climate 
change.
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Figure SPM.2: Five integrative reasons for concern (RFCs) provide a framework for summarizing 
key impacts and risks across sectors and regions, and were introduced in the IPCC Third 
Assessment Report. RFCs illustrate the implications of global warming for people, economies, and 
ecosystems. Impacts and/or risks for each RFC are based on assessment of the new literature that 
has appeared. As in the AR5, this literature was used to make expert judgments to assess the levels 
of global warming at which levels of impact and/or risk are undetectable, moderate, high or very 
high. The selection of impacts and risks to natural, managed and human systems in the lower panel 
is illustrative and is not intended to be fully comprehensive. RFC1 Unique and threatened 
systems: ecological and human systems that have restricted geographic ranges constrained by 
climate related conditions and have high endemism or other distinctive properties. Examples 
include coral reefs, the Arctic and its indigenous people, mountain glaciers, and biodiversity 
hotspots. RFC2 Extreme weather events: risks/impacts to human health, livelihoods, assets, and 
ecosystems from extreme weather events such as heat waves, heavy rain, drought and associated 
wildfires, and coastal flooding. RFC3 Distribution of impacts: risks/impacts that 
disproportionately affect particular groups due to uneven distribution of physical climate change 
hazards, exposure or vulnerability. RFC4 Global aggregate impacts: global monetary damage, 
global scale degradation and loss of ecosystems and biodiversity. RFC5 Large-scale singular 
events: are relatively large, abrupt and sometimes irreversible changes in systems that are caused 
by global warming. Examples include disintegration of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets. 
{3.4, 3.5, 3.5.2.1, 3.5.2.2, 3.5.2.3, 3.5.2.4, 3.5.2.5, 5.4.1 5.5.3, 5.6.1, Box 3.4} 
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B6. Most adaptation needs will be lower for global warming of 1.5°C compared to 2°C (high 
confidence). There are a wide range of adaptation options that can reduce the risks of climate 
change (high confidence). There are limits to adaptation and adaptive capacity for some 
human and natural systems at global warming of 1.5°C, with associated losses (medium 
confidence). The number and availability of adaptation options vary by sector (medium 
confidence). {Table 3.5, 4.3, 4.5, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in 
Chapter 5}  
 
B6.1. A wide range of adaptation options are available to reduce the risks to natural and managed 
ecosystems (e.g., ecosystem-based adaptation, ecosystem restoration and avoided degradation and 
deforestation, biodiversity management, sustainable aquaculture, and local knowledge and 
indigenous knowledge), the risks of sea level rise (e.g., coastal defence and hardening), and the 
risks to health, livelihoods, food, water, and economic growth, especially in rural landscapes (e.g., 
efficient irrigation, social safety nets, disaster risk management, risk spreading and sharing, 
community-based adaptation) and urban areas (e.g., green infrastructure, sustainable land use and 
planning, and sustainable water management) (medium confidence). {4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.3.5, 
4.5.3, 4.5.4, 5.3.2, Box 4.2, Box 4.3, Box 4.6, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4}. 
 
B6.2. Adaptation is expected to be more challenging for ecosystems, food and health systems at 
2°C of global warming than for 1.5°C (medium confidence). Some vulnerable regions, including 
small islands and Least Developed Countries, are projected to experience high multiple interrelated 
climate risks even at global warming of 1.5°C (high confidence). {3.3.1, 3.4.5, Box 3.5, Table 3.5, 
Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, 5.6, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5, Box 5.3} 
 
B6.3. Limits to adaptive capacity exist at 1.5°C of global warming, become more pronounced at 
higher levels of warming and vary by sector, with site-specific implications for vulnerable regions, 
ecosystems, and human health (medium confidence) {Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5, Box 3.5, 
Table 3.5}  
 
C. Emission Pathways and System Transitions Consistent with 1.5°C Global Warming 
 
C1. In model pathways with no or limited overshoot of 1.5°C, global net anthropogenic CO2 
emissions decline by about 45% from 2010 levels by 2030 (40–60% interquartile range), 
reaching net zero around 2050 (2045–2055 interquartile range). For limiting global warming 
to below 2°C11 CO2 emissions are projected to decline by about 20% by 2030 in most 
pathways (10–30% interquartile range) and reach net zero around 2075 (2065–2080 
interquartile range). Non-CO2 emissions in pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C show 
deep reductions that are similar to those in pathways limiting warming to 2°C. (high 
confidence) (Figure SPM.3a) {2.1, 2.3, Table 2.4}  
 
C1.1. CO2 emissions reductions that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot can 
involve different portfolios of mitigation measures, striking different balances between lowering 
energy and resource intensity, rate of decarbonization, and the reliance on carbon dioxide removal. 
Different portfolios face different implementation challenges, and potential synergies and trade-offs 
with sustainable development. (high confidence). (Figure SPM.3b) {2.3.2, 2.3.4, 2.4, 2.5.3}   
                                               
 
 
11 References to pathways limiting global warming to 2oC are based on a 66% probability of staying below 2oC. 
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C1.2. Modelled pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot involve 
deep reductions in emissions of methane and black carbon (35% or more of both by 2050 relative to 
2010). These pathways also reduce most of the cooling aerosols, which partially offsets mitigation 
effects for two to three decades. Non-CO2 emissions12 can be reduced as a result of broad mitigation 
measures in the energy sector. In addition, targeted non-CO2 mitigation measures can reduce nitrous 
oxide and methane from agriculture, methane from the waste sector, some sources of black carbon, 
and hydrofluorocarbons. High bioenergy demand can increase emissions of nitrous oxide in some 
1.5°C pathways, highlighting the importance of appropriate management approaches. Improved air 
quality resulting from projected reductions in many non-CO2 emissions provide direct and 
immediate population health benefits in all 1.5°C model pathways. (high confidence) (Figure 
SPM.3a) {2.2.1, 2.3.3, 2.4.4, 2.5.3, 4.3.6, 5.4.2}  
 
C1.3. Limiting global warming requires limiting the total cumulative global anthropogenic 
emissions of CO2 since the preindustrial period, i.e. staying within a total carbon budget (high 
confidence).13 By the end of 2017, anthropogenic CO2 emissions since the preindustrial period are 
estimated to have reduced the total carbon budget for 1.5°C by approximately 2200 ± 320 GtCO2 
(medium confidence). The associated remaining budget is being depleted by current emissions of 42 
± 3 GtCO2 per year (high confidence). The choice of the measure of global temperature affects the 
estimated remaining carbon budget. Using global mean surface air temperature, as in AR5, gives an 
estimate of the remaining carbon budget of 580 GtCO2 for a 50% probability of limiting warming to 
1.5°C, and 420 GtCO2 for a 66% probability (medium confidence).14 Alternatively, using GMST 
gives estimates of 770 and 570 GtCO2, for 50% and 66% probabilities,15 respectively (medium 
confidence). Uncertainties in the size of these estimated remaining carbon budgets are substantial 
and depend on several factors. Uncertainties in the climate response to CO2 and non-CO2 emissions 
contribute ±400 GtCO2 and the level of historic warming contributes ±250 GtCO2 (medium 
confidence). Potential additional carbon release from future permafrost thawing and methane 
release from wetlands would reduce budgets by up to 100 GtCO2 over the course of this century and 
more thereafter (medium confidence). In addition, the level of non-CO2 mitigation in the future 
could alter the remaining carbon budget by 250 GtCO2 in either direction (medium confidence). 
{1.2.4, 2.2.2, 2.6.1, Table 2.2, Chapter 2 Supplementary Material} 
 
C1.4. Solar radiation modification (SRM) measures are not included in any of the available 
assessed pathways. Although some SRM measures may be theoretically effective in reducing an 
overshoot, they face large uncertainties and knowledge gaps as well as substantial risks, 
                                               
 
 
12 Non-CO2 emissions included in this report are all anthropogenic emissions other than CO2 that result in radiative forcing. These 
include short-lived climate forcers, such as methane, some fluorinated gases, ozone precursors, aerosols or aerosol precursors, such 
as black carbon and sulphur dioxide, respectively, as well as long-lived greenhouse gases, such as nitrous oxide or some fluorinated 
gases. The radiative forcing associated with non-CO2 emissions and changes in surface albedo is referred to as non-CO2 radiative 
forcing. {x.y} 
 
13 There is a clear scientific basis for a total carbon budget consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5°C. However, neither this 
total carbon budget nor the fraction of this budget taken up by past emissions were assessed in this report. 
 
14 Irrespective of the measure of global temperature used, updated understanding and further advances in methods have led to an 
increase in the estimated remaining carbon budget of about 300 GtCO2 compared to AR5. (medium confidence) {x.y} 
 
15 These estimates use observed GMST to 2006–2015 and estimate future temperature changes using near surface air temperatures.  
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institutional and social constraints to deployment related to governance, ethics, and impacts on 
sustainable development. They also do not mitigate ocean acidification. (medium confidence). 
{4.3.8, Cross-Chapter Box 10 in Chapter 4} 
  
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
Black carbon emissions
Nitrous oxide emissions
Methane emissions
Emissions of non-CO2 forcers are also reduced 
or limited in pathways limiting global warming 
to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot, but 
they do not reach zero globally. 
Non-CO₂ emissions relative to 2010
Billion tonnes of CO₂/yr
Global emissions pathway characteristics
General characteristics of the evolution of anthropogenic net emissions of CO2, and total emissions of 
methane, black carbon, and nitrous oxide in model pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or 
limited overshoot. Net emissions are defined as anthropogenic emissions reduced by anthropogenic 
removals. Reductions in net emissions can be achieved through diﬀerent portfolios of mitigation measures 
illustrated in Figure SPM3B.
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Figure SPM.3a: Global emissions pathway characteristics. The main panel shows global net anthropogenic CO2 
emissions in pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited (less than 0.1°C) overshoot and 
pathways with higher overshoot. The shaded area shows the full range for pathways analysed in this report. The 
panels on the right show non-CO2 emissions ranges for three compounds with large historical forcing and a 
substantial portion of emissions coming from sources distinct from those central to CO2 mitigation. Shaded areas 
in these panels show the 5–95% (light shading) and interquartile (dark shading) ranges of pathways limiting 
global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot. Box and whiskers at the bottom of the figure show the 
timing of pathways reaching global net zero CO2 emission levels, and a comparison with pathways limiting 
global warming to 2°C with at least 66% probability. Four illustrative model pathways are highlighted in the 
main panel and are labelled P1, P2, P3 and P4, corresponding to the LED, S1, S2, and S5 pathways assessed in 
Chapter 2. Descriptions and characteristics of these pathways are available in Figure SPM3b. {2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 
Figure 2.5, Figure 2.10, Figure 2.11}
Breakdown of contributions to global net CO2 emissions in four illustrative model pathways 
P1:  A scenario in which social, 
business, and technological 
innovations result in lower energy 
demand up to 2050 while living 
standards rise, especially in the global 
South. A down-sized energy system 
enables rapid decarbonisation of 
energy supply. Aﬀorestation is the only 
CDR option considered; neither fossil 
fuels with CCS nor BECCS are used.
P2:  A scenario with a broad focus on 
sustainability including energy 
intensity, human development, 
economic convergence and 
international cooperation, as well as 
shifts towards sustainable and healthy 
consumption patterns, low-carbon 
technology innovation, and 
well-managed land systems with 
limited societal acceptability for BECCS.
P3:  A middle-of-the-road scenario in
which societal as well as technological 
development follows historical 
patterns. Emissions reductions are 
mainly achieved by changing the way in 
which energy and products are 
produced, and to a lesser degree by 
reductions in demand.
P4:  A resource and energy-intensive 
scenario in which economic growth and 
globalization lead to widespread 
adoption of greenhouse-gas intensive 
lifestyles, including high demand for 
transportation fuels and livestock 
products. Emissions reductions are 
mainly achieved through technological 
means, making strong use of CDR 
through the deployment of BECCS.
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Characteristics of four illustrative model pathways
Diﬀerent mitigation strategies can achieve the net emissions reductions that would be required to follow a 
pathway that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot. All pathways use Carbon Dioxide 
Removal (CDR), but the amount varies across pathways, as do the relative contributions of Bioenergy with 
Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) and removals in the Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) 
sector. This has implications for the emissions and several other pathway characteristics.
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NOTE: Indicators have been selected to show global trends identified by the Chapter 2 assessment. 
National and sectoral characteristics can diﬀer substantially from the global trends shown above.
* Kyoto-gas emissions are based on SAR GWP-100
** Changes in energy demand are associated with improvements in energy 
eﬀiciency and behaviour change
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Figure SPM.3b: Characteristics of four illustrative model pathways in relation to global warming of 
1.5°C introduced in Figure SPM3a. These pathways were selected to show a range of potential 
mitigation approaches and vary widely in their projected energy and land use, as well as their 
assumptions about future socioeconomic developments, including economic and population growth, 
equity and sustainability. A breakdown of the global net anthropogenic CO2 emissions into the 
contributions in terms of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel and industry, agriculture, forestry and other 
land use (AFOLU), and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) is shown. AFOLU 
estimates reported here are not necessarily comparable with countries’ estimates. Further 
characteristics for each of these pathways are listed below each pathway. These pathways illustrate 
relative global differences in mitigation strategies, but do not represent central estimates, national 
strategies, and do not indicate requirements. For comparison, the right-most column shows the 
interquartile ranges across pathways with no or limited overshoot of 1.5°C. Pathways P1, P2, P3 
and P4, correspond to the LED, S1, S2, and S5 pathways assessed in Chapter 2. (Figure SPM.3a) 
{2.2.1, 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 2.4.4, 2.5.3, Figure 2.5, Figure 2.6, Figure 2.9, Figure 
2.10, Figure 2.11, Figure 2.14, Figure 2.15, Figure 2.16, Figure 2.17, Figure 2.24, Figure 2.25, 
Table 2.4, Table 2.6, Table 2.7, Table 2.9, Table 4.1}  
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C2. Pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot would require 
rapid and far-reaching transitions in energy, land, urban and infrastructure (including 
transport and buildings), and industrial systems (high confidence). These systems transitions 
are unprecedented in terms of scale, but not necessarily in terms of speed, and imply deep 
emissions reductions in all sectors, a wide portfolio of mitigation options and a significant 
upscaling of investments in those options (medium confidence). {2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5} 
 
C2.1. Pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot show system 
changes that are more rapid and pronounced over the next two decades than in 2°C pathways (high 
confidence). The rates of system changes associated with limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no 
or limited overshoot have occurred in the past within specific sectors, technologies and spatial 
contexts, but there is no documented historic precedent for their scale (medium confidence). {2.3.3, 
2.3.4, 2.4, 2.5, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4}  
 
C2.2. In energy systems, modelled global pathways (considered in the literature) limiting global 
warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot (for more details see Figure SPM.3b), generally 
meet energy service demand with lower energy use, including through enhanced energy efficiency, 
and show faster electrification of energy end use compared to 2°C (high confidence). In 1.5°C 
pathways with no or limited overshoot, low-emission energy sources are projected to have a higher 
share, compared with 2°C pathways, particularly before 2050 (high confidence). In 1.5°C pathways 
with no or limited overshoot, renewables are projected to supply 70–85% (interquartile range) of 
electricity in 2050 (high confidence). In electricity generation, shares of nuclear and fossil fuels 
with carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) are modelled to increase in most 1.5°C pathways 
with no or limited overshoot. In modelled 1.5°C pathways with limited or no overshoot, the use of 
CCS would allow the electricity generation share of gas to be approximately 8% (3–11% 
interquartile range) of global electricity in 2050, while the use of coal shows a steep reduction in all 
pathways and would be reduced to close to 0% (0–2%) of electricity (high confidence). While 
acknowledging the challenges, and differences between the options and national circumstances, 
political, economic, social and technical feasibility of solar energy, wind energy and electricity 
storage technologies have substantially improved over the past few years (high confidence). These 
improvements signal a potential system transition in electricity generation (Figure SPM.3b) {2.4.1, 
2.4.2, Figure 2.1, Table 2.6, Table 2.7, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3, 4.2.1, 4.3.1, 4.3.3, 4.5.2} 
 
C2.3. CO2 emissions from industry in pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or 
limited overshoot are projected to be about 75–90% (interquartile range) lower in 2050 relative to 
2010, as compared to 50–80% for global warming of 2oC (medium confidence). Such reductions can 
be achieved through combinations of new and existing technologies and practices, including 
electrification, hydrogen, sustainable bio-based feedstocks, product substitution, and carbon 
capture, utilization and storage (CCUS). These options are technically proven at various scales but 
their large-scale deployment may be limited by economic, financial, human capacity and 
institutional constraints in specific contexts, and specific characteristics of large-scale industrial 
installations. In industry, emissions reductions by energy and process efficiency by themselves are 
insufficient for limiting warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot (high confidence). {2.4.3, 
4.2.1, Table 4.1, Table 4.3, 4.3.3, 4.3.4, 4.5.2} 
 
C2.4. The urban and infrastructure system transition consistent with limiting global warming to 
1.5°C with no or limited overshoot would imply, for example, changes in land and urban planning 
practices, as well as deeper emissions reductions in transport and buildings compared to pathways 
that limit global warming below 2°C (see 2.4.3; 4.3.3; 4.2.1) (medium confidence). Technical 
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measures and practices enabling deep emissions reductions include various energy efficiency 
options. In pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot, the electricity 
share of energy demand in buildings would be about 55–75% in 2050 compared to 50–70% in 2050 
for 2°C global warming (medium confidence). In the transport sector, the share of low-emission 
final energy would rise from less than 5% in 2020 to about 35–65% in 2050 compared to 25–45% 
for 2°C global warming (medium confidence). Economic, institutional and socio-cultural barriers 
may inhibit these urban and infrastructure system transitions, depending on national, regional and 
local circumstances, capabilities and the availability of capital (high confidence). {2.3.4, 2.4.3, 
4.2.1, Table 4.1, 4.3.3, 4.5.2}.  
 
C2.5. Transitions in global and regional land use are found in all pathways limiting global warming 
to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot, but their scale depends on the pursued mitigation portfolio. 
Model pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot project the 
conversion of 0.5–8 million km2 of pasture and 0–5 million km2 of non-pasture agricultural land for 
food and feed crops into 1–7 million km2 for energy crops and a 1 million km2 reduction to 10 
million km2 increase in forests by 2050 relative to 2010 (medium confidence).16 Land use transitions 
of similar magnitude can be observed in modelled 2°C pathways (medium confidence). Such large 
transitions pose profound challenges for sustainable management of the various demands on land 
for human settlements, food, livestock feed, fibre, bioenergy, carbon storage, biodiversity and other 
ecosystem services (high confidence). Mitigation options limiting the demand for land include 
sustainable intensification of land use practices, ecosystem restoration and changes towards less 
resource-intensive diets (high confidence). The implementation of land-based mitigation options 
would require overcoming socio-economic, institutional, technological, financing and 
environmental barriers that differ across regions (high confidence). {2.4.4, Figure 2.24, 4.3.2, 4.5.2, 
Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3} 
 
C2.6 Total annual average energy-related mitigation investment for the period 2015 to 2050 in 
pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C is estimated to be around 900 billion USD2015 (range of 180 
billion to 1800 billion USD2015 across six models17). This corresponds to total annual average 
energy supply investments of 1600 to 3800 billion USD2015 and total annual average energy 
demand investments of 700 to 1000 billion USD2015 for the period 2015 to 2050, and an increase 
in total energy-related investments of about 12% (range of 3% to 23%) in 1.5°C pathways relative 
to 2°C pathways. Average annual investment in low-carbon energy technologies and energy 
efficiency are upscaled by roughly a factor of five (range of factor of 4 to 5) by 2050 compared to 
2015 (medium confidence). {2.5.2, Box 4.8, Figure 2.27} 
 
C2.7. Modelled pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot project a 
wide range of global average discounted marginal abatement costs over the 21st century. They are 
roughly 3-4 times higher than in pathways limiting global warming to below 2°C (high confidence). 
The economic literature distinguishes marginal abatement costs from total mitigation costs in the 
economy. The literature on total mitigation costs of 1.5°C mitigation pathways is limited and was 
not assessed in this report. Knowledge gaps remain in the integrated assessment of the economy 
wide costs and benefits of mitigation in line with pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C. {2.5.2; 2.6; 
Figure 2.26} 
                                               
 
 
16 The projected land use changes presented are not deployed to their upper limits simultaneously in a single pathway. 
 
17 Including two pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot and four pathways with high overshoot. 
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C3. All pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with limited or no overshoot project the 
use of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) on the order of 100–1000 GtCO2 over the 21st century. 
CDR would be used to compensate for residual emissions and, in most cases, achieve net 
negative emissions to return global warming to 1.5°C following a peak (high confidence). CDR 
deployment of several hundreds of GtCO2 is subject to multiple feasibility and sustainability 
constraints (high confidence). Significant near-term emissions reductions and measures to 
lower energy and land demand can limit CDR deployment to a few hundred GtCO2 without 
reliance on bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) (high confidence). {2.3, 2.4, 
3.6.2, 4.3, 5.4}   
 
C3.1. Existing and potential CDR measures include afforestation and reforestation, land 
restoration and soil carbon sequestration, BECCS, direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS), 
enhanced weathering and ocean alkalinization. These differ widely in terms of maturity, potentials, 
costs, risks, co-benefits and trade-offs (high confidence). To date, only a few published pathways 
include CDR measures other than afforestation and BECCS. {2.3.4, 3.6.2, 4.3.2, 4.3.7} 
 
C3.2. In pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with limited or no overshoot, BECCS 
deployment is projected to range from 0–1, 0–8, and 0–16 GtCO2 yr-1 in 2030, 2050, and 2100, 
respectively, while agriculture, forestry and land-use (AFOLU) related CDR measures are projected 
to remove 0–5, 1–11, and 1–5 GtCO2 yr-1 in these years (medium confidence). The upper end of 
these deployment ranges by mid-century exceeds the BECCS potential of up to 5 GtCO2 yr-1 and 
afforestation potential of up to 3.6 GtCO2 yr-1 assessed based on recent literature (medium 
confidence). Some pathways avoid BECCS deployment completely through demand-side measures 
and greater reliance on AFOLU-related CDR measures (medium confidence). The use of bioenergy 
can be as high or even higher when BECCS is excluded compared to when it is included due to its 
potential for replacing fossil fuels across sectors (high confidence). (Figure SPM.3b) {2.3.3, 2.3.4, 
2.4.2, 3.6.2, 4.3.1, 4.2.3, 4.3.2, 4.3.7, 4.4.3, Table 2.4} 
 
C3.3. Pathways that overshoot 1.5°C of global warming rely on CDR exceeding residual CO2 
emissions later in the century to return to below 1.5°C by 2100, with larger overshoots requiring 
greater amounts of CDR (Figure SPM.3b). (high confidence). Limitations on the speed, scale, and 
societal acceptability of CDR deployment hence determine the ability to return global warming to 
below 1.5°C following an overshoot. Carbon cycle and climate system understanding is still limited 
about the effectiveness of net negative emissions to reduce temperatures after they peak (high 
confidence). {2.2, 2.3.4, 2.3.5, 2.6, 4.3.7, 4.5.2, Table 4.11} 
 
C3.4. Most current and potential CDR measures could have significant impacts on land, energy, 
water, or nutrients if deployed at large scale (high confidence). Afforestation and bioenergy may 
compete with other land uses and may have significant impacts on agricultural and food systems, 
biodiversity and other ecosystem functions and services (high confidence). Effective governance is 
needed to limit such trade-offs and ensure permanence of carbon removal in terrestrial, geological 
and ocean reservoirs (high confidence). Feasibility and sustainability of CDR use could be enhanced 
by a portfolio of options deployed at substantial, but lesser scales, rather than a single option at very 
large scale (high confidence). (Figure SPM.3b). {2.3.4, 2.4.4, 2.5.3, 2.6, 3.6.2, 4.3.2, 4.3.7, 4.5.2, 
5.4.1, 5.4.2; Cross-Chapter Boxes 7 and 8 in Chapter 3, Table 4.11, Table 5.3, Figure 5.3} 
 
C3.5. Some AFOLU-related CDR measures such as restoration of natural ecosystems and soil 
carbon sequestration could provide co-benefits such as improved biodiversity, soil quality, and local 
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food security. If deployed at large scale, they would require governance systems enabling 
sustainable land management to conserve and protect land carbon stocks and other ecosystem 
functions and services (medium confidence). (Figure SPM.4) {2.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.4.2, 2.4.4, 3.6.2, 5.4.1, 
Cross-Chapter Boxes 3 in Chapter 1 and 7 in Chapter 3, 4.3.2, 4.3.7, 4.4.1, 4.5.2, Table 2.4} 
 
D. Strengthening the Global Response in the Context of Sustainable Development and Efforts 
to Eradicate Poverty 
 
D1. Estimates of the global emissions outcome of current nationally stated mitigation 
ambitions as submitted under the Paris Agreement would lead to global greenhouse gas 
emissions18 in 2030 of 52–58 GtCO2eq yr-1 (medium confidence). Pathways reflecting these 
ambitions would not limit global warming to 1.5°C, even if supplemented by very challenging 
increases in the scale and ambition of emissions reductions after 2030 (high confidence). 
Avoiding overshoot and reliance on future large-scale deployment of carbon dioxide removal 
(CDR) can only be achieved if global CO2 emissions start to decline well before 2030 (high 
confidence). {1.2, 2.3, 3.3, 3.4, 4.2, 4.4, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4}  
 
D1.1. Pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot show clear 
emission reductions by 2030 (high confidence). All but one show a decline in global greenhouse gas 
emissions to below 35 GtCO2eq yr-1 in 2030, and half of available pathways fall within the 25–30 
GtCO2eq yr-1 range (interquartile range), a 40–50% reduction from 2010 levels (high confidence). 
Pathways reflecting current nationally stated mitigation ambition until 2030 are broadly consistent 
with cost-effective pathways that result in a global warming of about 3°C by 2100, with warming 
continuing afterwards (medium confidence). {2.3.3, 2.3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4, 
5.5.3.2} 
 
D1.2. Overshoot trajectories result in higher impacts and associated challenges compared to 
pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot (high confidence). 
Reversing warming after an overshoot of 0.2°C or larger during this century would require 
upscaling and deployment of CDR at rates and volumes that might not be achievable given 
considerable implementation challenges (medium confidence). {1.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.3.5, 2.5.1, 3.3, 4.3.7, 
Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4} 
 
D1.3. The lower the emissions in 2030, the lower the challenge in limiting global warming to 1.5°C 
after 2030 with no or limited overshoot (high confidence). The challenges from delayed actions to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions include the risk of cost escalation, lock-in in carbon-emitting 
infrastructure, stranded assets, and reduced flexibility in future response options in the medium to 
long-term (high confidence). These may increase uneven distributional impacts between countries at 
different stages of development (medium confidence). {2.3.5, 4.4.5, 5.4.2} 
 
D2. The avoided climate change impacts on sustainable development, eradication of poverty 
and reducing inequalities would be greater if global warming were limited to 1.5°C rather 
than 2°C, if mitigation and adaptation synergies are maximized while trade-offs are 
minimized (high confidence). {1.1, 1.4, 2.5, 3.3, 3.4, 5.2, Table 5.1} 
  
                                               
 
 
18 GHG emissions have been aggregated with 100-year GWP values as introduced in the IPCC Second Assessment Report 
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D2.1. Climate change impacts and responses are closely linked to sustainable development which 
balances social well-being, economic prosperity and environmental protection. The United Nations 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted in 2015, provide an established framework for 
assessing the links between global warming of 1.5°C or 2°C and development goals that include 
poverty eradication, reducing inequalities, and climate action (high confidence) {Cross-Chapter Box 
4 in Chapter 1, 1.4, 5.1} 
 
D2.2. The consideration of ethics and equity can help address the uneven distribution of adverse 
impacts associated with 1.5°C and higher levels of global warming, as well as those from mitigation 
and adaptation, particularly for poor and disadvantaged populations, in all societies (high 
confidence). {1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.4.3, 2.5.3, 3.4.10, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3. 5.4, Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 1, 
Cross-Chapter Boxes 6 and 8 in Chapter 3, and Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5} 
 
D2.3. Mitigation and adaptation consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5°C are underpinned 
by enabling conditions, assessed in SR1.5 across the geophysical, environmental-ecological, 
technological, economic, socio-cultural and institutional dimensions of feasibility. Strengthened 
multi-level governance, institutional capacity, policy instruments, technological innovation and 
transfer and mobilization of finance, and changes in human behaviour and lifestyles are enabling 
conditions that enhance the feasibility of mitigation and adaptation options for 1.5°C consistent 
systems transitions. (high confidence) {1.4, Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 1, 4.4, 4.5, 5.6} 
 
D3. Adaptation options specific to national contexts, if carefully selected together with 
enabling conditions, will have benefits for sustainable development and poverty reduction 
with global warming of 1.5°C, although trade-offs are possible (high confidence). {1.4, 4.3, 4.5} 
 
D3.1. Adaptation options that reduce the vulnerability of human and natural systems have many 
synergies with sustainable development, if well managed, such as ensuring food and water security, 
reducing disaster risks, improving health conditions, maintaining ecosystem services and reducing 
poverty and inequality (high confidence). Increasing investment in physical and social infrastructure 
is a key enabling condition to enhance the resilience and the adaptive capacities of societies. These 
benefits can occur in most regions with adaptation to 1.5°C of global warming (high confidence). 
{1.4.3, 4.2.2, 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.3.5, 4.4.1, 4.4.3, 4.5.3, 5.3.1, 5.3.2} 
 
D3.2. Adaptation to 1.5°C global warming can also result in trade–offs or maladaptations with 
adverse impacts for sustainable development. For example, if poorly designed or implemented, 
adaptation projects in a range of sectors can increase greenhouse gas emissions and water use, 
increase gender and social inequality, undermine health conditions, and encroach on natural 
ecosystems (high confidence). These trade-offs can be reduced by adaptations that include attention 
to poverty and sustainable development (high confidence). {4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.5.4, 5.3.2; Cross-Chapter 
Boxes 6 and 7 in Chapter 3}  
 
D3.3. A mix of adaptation and mitigation options to limit global warming to 1.5°C, implemented in 
a participatory and integrated manner, can enable rapid, systemic transitions in urban and rural areas 
(high confidence). These are most effective when aligned with economic and sustainable 
development, and when local and regional governments and decision makers are supported by 
national governments (medium confidence) {4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.4.1, 4.4.2} 
 
D3.4. Adaptation options that also mitigate emissions can provide synergies and cost savings in 
most sectors and system transitions, such as when land management reduces emissions and disaster 
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risk, or when low carbon buildings are also designed for efficient cooling. Trade-offs between 
mitigation and adaptation, when limiting global warming to 1.5°C, such as when bioenergy crops, 
reforestation or afforestation encroach on land needed for agricultural adaptation, can undermine 
food security, livelihoods, ecosystem functions and services and other aspects of sustainable 
development. (high confidence) {3.4.3, 4.3.2, 4.3.4, 4.4.1, 4.5.2, 4.5.3, 4.5.4} 
 
D4. Mitigation options consistent with 1.5°C pathways are associated with multiple synergies 
and trade-offs across the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). While the total number of 
possible synergies exceeds the number of trade-offs, their net effect will depend on the pace 
and magnitude of changes, the composition of the mitigation portfolio and the management of 
the transition. (high confidence) (Figure SPM.4) {2.5, 4.5, 5.4}  
 
D4.1. 1.5°C pathways have robust synergies particularly for the SDGs 3 (health), 7 (clean energy), 
11 (cities and communities), 12 (responsible consumption and production), and 14 (oceans) (very 
high confidence). Some 1.5°C pathways show potential trade-offs with mitigation for SDGs 1 
(poverty), 2 (hunger), 6 (water), and 7 (energy access), if not carefully managed (high confidence) 
(Figure SPM.4). {5.4.2; Figure 5.4, Cross-Chapter Boxes 7 and 8 in Chapter 3}   
 
D4.2. 1.5°C pathways that include low energy demand (e.g., see P1 in Figure SPM.3a and SPM.3b), 
low material consumption, and low GHG-intensive food consumption have the most pronounced 
synergies and the lowest number of trade-offs with respect to sustainable development and the 
SDGs (high confidence). Such pathways would reduce dependence on CDR. In modelled pathways 
sustainable development, eradicating poverty and reducing inequality can support limiting warming 
to 1.5◦C. (high confidence) (Figure SPM.3b, Figure SPM.4) {2.4.3, 2.5.1, 2.5.3, Figure 2.4, Figure 
2.28, 5.4.1, 5.4.2, Figure 5.4}  
 
D4.3. 1.5°C and 2°C modelled pathways often rely on the deployment of large-scale land-related 
measures like afforestation and bioenergy supply, which, if poorly managed, can compete with food 
production and hence raise food security concerns (high confidence). The impacts of carbon dioxide 
removal (CDR) options on SDGs depend on the type of options and the scale of deployment (high 
confidence). If poorly implemented, CDR options such as BECCS and AFOLU options would lead 
to trade-offs. Context-relevant design and implementation requires considering people’s needs, 
biodiversity, and other sustainable development dimensions (very high confidence). {Figure SPM.4, 
5.4.1.3, Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3}  
 
D4.4. Mitigation consistent with 1.5°C pathways creates risks for sustainable development in 
regions with high dependency on fossil fuels for revenue and employment generation (high 
confidence). Policies that promote diversification of the economy and the energy sector can address 
the associated challenges (high confidence). {5.4.1.2, Box 5.2}  
 
D4.5. Redistributive policies across sectors and populations that shield the poor and vulnerable can 
resolve trade-offs for a range of SDGs, particularly hunger, poverty and energy access. Investment 
needs for such complementary policies are only a small fraction of the overall mitigation 
investments in 1.5°C pathways. (high confidence) {2.4.3, 5.4.2, Figure 5.5}  
 
  
Indicative linkages between mitigation options and sustainable 
development using SDGs (The linkages do not show costs and benefits)
Mitigation options deployed in each sector can be associated with potential positive eﬀects (synergies) or 
negative eﬀects (trade-oﬀs) with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The degree to which this 
potential is realized will depend on the selected portfolio of mitigation options, mitigation policy design, 
and local circumstances and context. Particularly in the energy-demand sector, the potential for synergies is 
larger than for trade-oﬀs. The bars group individually assessed options by level of confidence and take into 
account the relative strength of the assessed mitigation-SDG connections.
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Figure SPM.4: Potential synergies and trade-offs between the sectoral portfolio of climate change 
mitigation options and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs serve as an 
analytical framework for the assessment of the different sustainable development dimensions, 
which extend beyond the time frame of the 2030 SDG targets. The assessment is based on literature 
on mitigation options that are considered relevant for 1.5ºC. The assessed strength of the SDG 
interactions is based on the qualitative and quantitative assessment of individual mitigation options 
listed in Table 5.2. For each mitigation option, the strength of the SDG-connection as well as the 
associated confidence of the underlying literature (shades of green and red) was assessed. The 
strength of positive connections (synergies) and negative connections (trade-offs) across all 
individual options within a sector (see Table 5.2) are aggregated into sectoral potentials for the 
whole mitigation portfolio. The (white) areas outside the bars, which indicate no interactions, have 
low confidence due to the uncertainty and limited number of studies exploring indirect effects. The 
strength of the connection considers only the effect of mitigation and does not include benefits of 
avoided impacts. SDG 13 (climate action) is not listed because mitigation is being considered in 
terms of interactions with SDGs and not vice versa. The bars denote the strength of the connection, 
and do not consider the strength of the impact on the SDGs. The energy demand sector comprises 
behavioural responses, fuel switching and efficiency options in the transport, industry and building 
sector as well as carbon capture options in the industry sector. Options assessed in the energy 
supply sector comprise biomass and non-biomass renewables, nuclear, CCS with bio-energy, and 
CCS with fossil fuels. Options in the land sector comprise agricultural and forest options, 
sustainable diets & reduced food waste, soil sequestration, livestock & manure management, 
reduced deforestation, afforestation & reforestation, responsible sourcing. In addition to this figure, 
options in the ocean sector are discussed in the underlying report. {5.4, Table 5.2, Figure 5.2} 
 
Statement for knowledge gap: 
Information about the net impacts of mitigation on sustainable development in 1.5°C pathways is 
available only for a limited number of SDGs and mitigation options. Only a limited number of 
studies have assessed the benefits of avoided climate change impacts of 1.5°C pathways for the 
SDGs, and the co-effects of adaptation for mitigation and the SDGs. The assessment of the 
indicative mitigation potentials in Figure SPM.4 is a step further from AR5 towards a more 
comprehensive and integrated assessment in the future. 
 
 
  
Approved SPM – copyedit pending  IPCC SR1.5 
 
 
 
 SPM-29 Total pages: 33 
 
 
D5. Limiting the risks from global warming of 1.5°C in the context of sustainable 
development and poverty eradication implies system transitions that can be enabled by an 
increase of adaptation and mitigation investments, policy instruments, the acceleration of 
technological innovation and behaviour changes (high confidence). {2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 3.2, 4.2, 4.4, 
4.5, 5.2, 5.5, 5.6} 
 
D5.1. Directing finance towards investment in infrastructure for mitigation and adaptation could 
provide additional resources. This could involve the mobilization of private funds by institutional 
investors, asset managers and development or investment banks, as well as the provision of public 
funds. Government policies that lower the risk of low-emission and adaptation investments can 
facilitate the mobilization of private funds and enhance the effectiveness of other public policies. 
Studies indicate a number of challenges including access to finance and mobilisation of funds (high 
confidence) {2.5.2, 4.4.5} 
 
D5.2. Adaptation finance consistent with global warming of 1.5°C is difficult to quantify and 
compare with 2°C. Knowledge gaps include insufficient data to calculate specific climate 
resilience-enhancing investments, from the provision of currently underinvested basic 
infrastructure. Estimates of the costs of adaptation might be lower at global warming of 1.5°C than 
for 2°C. Adaptation needs have typically been supported by public sector sources such as national 
and subnational government budgets, and in developing countries together with support from 
development assistance, multilateral development banks, and UNFCCC channels (medium 
confidence). More recently there is a growing understanding of the scale and increase in NGO and 
private funding in some regions (medium confidence). Barriers include the scale of adaptation 
financing, limited capacity and access to adaptation finance (medium confidence).{4.4.5, 4.6} 
 
D5.3. Global model pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C are projected to involve the annual 
average investment needs in the energy system of around 2.4 trillion USD2010 between 2016 and 
2035 representing about 2.5% of the world GDP (medium confidence). {2.5.2, 4.4.5, Box 4.8} 
 
D5.4. Policy tools can help mobilise incremental resources, including through shifting global 
investments and savings and through market and non-market based instruments as well as 
accompanying measures to secure the equity of the transition, acknowledging the challenges  
related with implementation including those of energy costs, depreciation of assets and impacts on 
international competition, and utilizing the opportunities to maximize co-benefits (high confidence) 
{1.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.3.5, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3 and 11 in Chapter 4, 4.4.5, 
5.5.2} 
 
D5.5. The systems transitions consistent with adapting to and limiting global warming to 1.5°C 
include the widespread adoption of new and possibly disruptive technologies and practices and 
enhanced climate-driven innovation. These imply enhanced technological innovation capabilities, 
including in industry and finance. Both national innovation policies and international cooperation 
can contribute to the development, commercialization and widespread adoption of mitigation and 
adaptation technologies. Innovation policies may be more effective when they combine public 
support for research and development with policy mixes that provide incentives for technology 
diffusion. (high confidence) {4.4.4, 4.4.5}.   
 
D5.6. Education, information, and community approaches, including those that are informed by 
Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge, can accelerate the wide scale behaviour changes 
consistent with adapting to and limiting global warming to 1.5°C. These approaches are more 
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effective when combined with other policies and tailored to the motivations, capabilities, and 
resources of specific actors and contexts (high confidence). Public acceptability can enable or 
inhibit the implementation of policies and measures to limit global warming to 1.5°C and to adapt 
to the consequences. Public acceptability depends on the individual’s evaluation of expected policy 
consequences, the perceived fairness of the distribution of these consequences, and perceived 
fairness of decision procedures (high confidence). {1.1, 1.5, 4.3.5, 4.4.1, 4.4.3, Box 4.3, 5.5.3, 
5.6.5}  
 
D6. Sustainable development supports, and often enables, the fundamental societal and 
systems transitions and transformations that help limit global warming to 1.5°C. Such 
changes facilitate the pursuit of climate-resilient development pathways that achieve 
ambitious mitigation and adaptation in conjunction with poverty eradication and efforts to 
reduce inequalities (high confidence). {Box 1.1, 1.4.3, Figure 5.1, 5.5.3, Box 5.3}  
 
D6.1. Social justice and equity are core aspects of climate-resilient development pathways that aim 
to limit global warming to 1.5°C as they address challenges and inevitable trade-offs, widen 
opportunities, and ensure that options, visions, and values are deliberated, between and within 
countries and communities, without making the poor and disadvantaged worse off (high 
confidence). {5.5.2, 5.5.3, Box 5.3, Figure 5.1, Figure 5.6, Cross-Chapter Boxes 12 and 13 in 
Chapter 5} 
 
D6.2. The potential for climate-resilient development pathways differs between and within regions 
and nations, due to different development contexts and systemic vulnerabilities (very high 
confidence). Efforts along such pathways to date have been limited (medium confidence) and 
enhanced efforts would involve strengthened and timely action from all countries and non-state 
actors (high confidence). {5.5.1, 5.5.3, Figure 5.1} 
 
D6.3. Pathways that are consistent with sustainable development show fewer mitigation and 
adaptation challenges and are associated with lower mitigation costs. The large majority of 
modelling studies could not construct pathways characterized by lack of international cooperation, 
inequality and poverty that were able to limit global warming to 1.5°C. (high confidence) {2.3.1, 
2.5.3, 5.5.2} 
 
D7. Strengthening the capacities for climate action of national and sub-national authorities, 
civil society, the private sector, indigenous peoples and local communities can support the 
implementation of ambitious actions implied by limiting global warming to 1.5°C (high 
confidence). International cooperation can provide an enabling environment for this to be 
achieved in all countries and for all people, in the context of sustainable development. 
International cooperation is a critical enabler for developing countries and vulnerable regions 
(high confidence). {1.4, 2.3, 2.5, 4.2, 4.4, 4.5, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5, Box 4.1, Box 4.2, Box 4.7, Box 
5.3, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, Cross-Chapter Box 13 in Chapter 5} 
 
D7.1. Partnerships involving non-state public and private actors, institutional investors, the banking 
system, civil society and scientific institutions would facilitate actions and responses consistent with 
limiting global warming to 1.5°C (very high confidence). {1.4, 4.4.1, 4.2.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.5, 4.5.3, 5.4.1, 
5.6.2, Box 5.3}. 
 
D7.2. Cooperation on strengthened accountable multilevel governance that includes non-state actors 
such as industry, civil society and scientific institutions, coordinated sectoral and cross-sectoral 
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policies at various governance levels, gender-sensitive policies, finance including innovative 
financing and cooperation on technology development and transfer can ensure participation, 
transparency, capacity building, and learning among different players (high confidence). {2.5.2, 
4.2.2, 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4, 4.5.3, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, 5.3.1, 4.4.5, 5.5.3, Cross-
Chapter Box 13 in Chapter 5, 5.6.1, 5.6.3} 
 
D7.3. International cooperation is a critical enabler for developing countries and vulnerable regions 
to strengthen their action for the implementation of 1.5°C-consistent climate responses, including 
through enhancing access to finance and technology and enhancing domestic capacities, taking into 
account national and local circumstances and needs (high confidence). {2.3.1, 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.4, 
4.4.5, 5.4.1 5.5.3, 5.6.1, Box 4.1, Box 4.2, Box 4.7}. 
 
D7.4. Collective efforts at all levels, in ways that reflect different circumstances and capabilities, in 
the pursuit of limiting global warming to 1.5oC, taking into account equity as well as effectiveness, 
can facilitate strengthening the global response to climate change, achieving sustainable 
development and eradicating poverty (high confidence). {1.4.2, 2.3.1, 2.5.2, 4.2.2, 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 
4.4.3, 4.4.4, 4.4.5, 4.5.3, 5.3.1, 5.4.1, 5.5.3, 5.6.1, 5.6.2, 5.6.3} 
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Box SPM 1: Core Concepts Central to this Special Report  
 
Global mean surface temperature (GMST): Estimated global average of near-surface air 
temperatures over land and sea-ice, and sea surface temperatures over ice-free ocean regions, with 
changes normally expressed as departures from a value over a specified reference period. 
When estimating changes in GMST, near-surface air temperature over both land and oceans are also 
used.19{1.2.1.1}  
 
Pre-industrial: The multi-century period prior to the onset of large-scale industrial activity around 
1750. The reference period 1850–1900 is used to approximate pre-industrial GMST. {1.2.1.2}  
 
Global warming: The estimated increase in GMST averaged over a 30-year period, or the 30-year 
period centered on a particular year or decade, expressed relative to pre-industrial levels unless 
otherwise specified. For 30-year periods that span past and future years, the current multi-decadal 
warming trend is assumed to continue. {1.2.1} 
 
Net zero CO2 emissions: Net-zero carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are achieved when anthropogenic 
CO2 emissions are balanced globally by anthropogenic CO2 removals over a specified period.  
 
Carbon dioxide removal (CDR): Anthropogenic activities removing CO2 from the atmosphere 
and durably storing it in geological, terrestrial, or ocean reservoirs, or in products. It includes 
existing and potential anthropogenic enhancement of biological or geochemical sinks and direct air 
capture and storage, but excludes natural CO2 uptake not directly caused by human activities. 
 
Total carbon budget: Estimated cumulative net global anthropogenic CO2 emissions from the 
preindustrial period to the time that anthropogenic CO2 emissions reach net zero that would result, at 
some probability, in limiting global warming to a given level, accounting for the impact of other 
anthropogenic emissions. {2.2.2}  
 
Remaining carbon budget: Estimated cumulative net global anthropogenic CO2 emissions from a 
given start date to the time that anthropogenic CO2 emissions reach net zero that would result, at some 
probability, in limiting global warming to a given level, accounting for the impact of other 
anthropogenic emissions. {2.2.2} 
 
Temperature overshoot: The temporary exceedance of a specified level of global warming.  
 
Emission pathways: In this Summary for Policymakers, the modelled trajectories of global 
anthropogenic emissions over the 21st century are termed emission pathways. Emission pathways 
are classified by their temperature trajectory over the 21st century: pathways giving at least 50% 
probability based on current knowledge of limiting global warming to below 1.5°C are classified as 
‘no overshoot’; those limiting warming to below 1.6°C and returning to 1.5°C by 2100 are 
classified as ‘1.5°C limited-overshoot’; while those exceeding 1.6°C but still returning to 1.5°C by 
2100 are classified as ‘higher-overshoot’. 
 
                                               
 
 
19 Past IPCC reports, reflecting the literature, have used a variety of approximately equivalent metrics of GMST change. 
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Impacts: Effects of climate change on human and natural systems. Impacts can have beneficial or 
adverse outcomes for livelihoods, health and well-being, ecosystems and species, services, 
infrastructure, and economic, social and cultural assets. 
 
Risk: The potential for adverse consequences from a climate-related hazard for human and 
natural systems, resulting from the interactions between the hazard and the vulnerability and 
exposure of the affected system. Risk integrates the likelihood of exposure to a hazard and the 
magnitude of its impact. Risk also can describe the potential for adverse consequences of adaptation 
or mitigation responses to climate change.  
 
Climate-resilient development pathways (CRDPs): Trajectories that strengthen sustainable 
development at multiple scales and efforts to eradicate poverty through equitable societal and 
systems transitions and transformations while reducing the threat of climate change through 
ambitious mitigation, adaptation, and climate resilience. 
 
 
